Government Agency Interventions in New Zealand’s and Australia’s Indigenous Popular Music Industries and Indigenous (Dis)Empowerment

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Abstract
Popular music is a key site for contemporary cultural and socio-political struggle. This article examines the extent to which indigenous authority and control has been exercised in the formulation of national indigenous popular music strategies, as well as within national arts funding agencies in New Zealand and Australia. It uses these case studies to show how the evolving political relationships between indigenous peoples and the nation-state have been played out within these sites of contestation. The extent to which indigenous peoples within both nations have exercised decision-making powers in these contexts, and the extent to which indigenous decision-making processes have been used, is also discussed.

Introduction
Popular music is a key site for contemporary cultural and socio-political struggle. While scholars researching this topic have tended to focus primarily on how people’s struggles for power are expressed via musical sounds, lyrics and images, an equally important arena in which these struggles have taken place is government-agency policies and strategic interventions in popular music industries.

Music advocates and lobbyists often play a key role in shaping popular music industries’ strategies and the activities of governments and government-funded bodies, yet this sphere of political struggle has been little studied to date (important exceptions include Breen 1989; Breen 1997; Cloonan 2008). Paraphrasing Marx, Martin Cloonan has noted, ‘men (and women) make music policies, but not under conditions of their own choosing. Importantly it is those conditions (and various attempts to change them) rather than anything inherent in the music which shape pop’s fate’ (2008, 3).

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This article focuses primarily on the political conditions that have played a role in shaping indigenous popular music’s fate in New Zealand. Although New Zealand-centric in focus, this article compares and contrasts New Zealand ethnographic and literary data with extant literature concerning government interventions in Australian Aboriginal popular music industries. This article thereby responds to Stephen Wild’s 2006 call for a revival of comparative ethnomusicology in these two nations, and marks a contribution to Australasian music research (see Bendrups 2013). New Zealand and Australia are comparable in their colonial histories, in that both have Dominion status and are members of the Commonwealth of Nations, and both nations have indigenous populations that are minorities in societies where the hegemonic group is of European descent. Despite these broad similarities, however, there are also significant historical differences between these nations, particularly in terms of indigenous participation in national/federal governance processes and structures, and in terms of the development trajectories of their national indigenous policies. These differences, as this article will show, have had an ongoing influence on government policy and interventions concerning indigenous popular music.

This article examines the extent to which indigenous authority and control have been exercised in the formulation of national indigenous popular music strategies, as well as within national arts funding agencies in Australia and New Zealand. These are examined here as case-study sites where struggles between indigenous empowerment and hegemonic control have taken place. This ‘struggle without end’ (Walker 1990) has a particular resonance in Australasian post-colonial contexts. In these contexts, it refers to indigenous peoples’ ongoing struggle to overcome European political and economic dominance and to achieve a greater degree of autonomy, as well as to their struggle to sustain and revive traditional knowledge, practices and processes and to have these recognised, respected and adhered to in formal governmental settings. In this article, the discussion focuses on the following questions: to what extent have indigenous decision-makers been included within or excluded from decision-making processes in these contexts; to what extent have indigenous decision-making processes been used; and how has the evolving power relationship between the hegemon and indigenous peoples been reflected in these contexts, such as through changes in the form of administrative reorganisation?

The following discussion utilises data from interviews conducted by the author with indigenous artists, managers and employees of government ministries and government-funded arts funding and broadcasting bodies.

**Case Study One: Indigenous Popular Music Strategies**

The development of indigenous music strategies has taken place with different degrees of indigenous participation and control in both Australia and New Zealand, and this can
be linked to broader shifts in the cultural-political relationships between indigenous and hegemonic cultural groups.

In the early 2000s, Māori were largely indistinguishable within New Zealand’s music industries. A representative of a label working with Māori artists interviewed for Douché’s scoping review of the New Zealand contemporary music industry went so far as to say that ‘there [was] no Māori music industry’ (Douché 2001, 38). There was no credible Māori entity to represent and advocate Māori vision and needs to relevant industry stakeholders, and Māori viewed mainstream music/arts agencies as incapable of representing Māori music or engaging effectively with Māori artists. Importantly, there was no coherent and coordinated strategy for supporting and promoting Māori popular music either locally or overseas. Rather, a series of ad hoc projects and initiatives had been implemented in an uncoordinated and fragmented way (Aperahama 2006, 120; Martin 2005, 12), in what Hareruia Aperahama (interview 1 February 2012) has described as ‘an ambulance-at-the-bottom-of-the-hill type approach’. Māori working within the New Zealand music industry at this time lacked infrastructure, vision and a political voice to articulate Māori development priorities and collective aspirations.

This situation soon changed. In the 1999 election, Labour was elected to power and Helen Clark became Prime Minister as well as Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage, a portfolio she retained until National took power in 2008. Under Labour, there was a hitherto unprecedented level of support for New Zealand popular music (see Scott 2013). The New Zealand Music Industry Commission (NZMIC) was formed in 2000, and the same year a panel comprising Māori music industry personnel was brought together to formulate a framework and strategy to support and promote Māori popular music. In 2003, this panel formally became known as the Māori Music Industry Coalition (MMIC), a voluntary board of Māori music practitioners operating under the auspices of the NZMIC with some funding from New Zealand Trade and Enterprise. The MMIC’s kaupapa (mandate) was to develop and advocate a collective vision for the future development of the Māori music industry, and to identify ways to overcome barriers to commercial and creative success, particularly in regard to music featuring te reo Māori lyrics (Black et. al. 2004, 44, 47).

The MMIC played a key advocacy role for the Māori music industry, presenting a five-year strategic plan for the Māori music industry in the form of its Te Hukuroa report (Martin 2005). Following consultation with industry participants, the MMIC identified the following areas as development priorities: mentoring new and emerging artists and managers; providing business-skill training for artists and managers; developing Māori music exports (particularly beyond world music markets); increasing the amount of Māori music (particularly featuring te reo Māori lyrics) broadcast via New Zealand radio and television; promoting funding opportunities; and creating high quality recordings (Martin 2005, 27).
In line with broader Māori self-determination efforts, the MMIC deliberately sought to be not merely an advisory body, but to become a maker of decisions by Māori, for Māori with respect to the development, implementation and governance of Māori music industry strategies (Aperahama 2006, 120-1). As Karini noted, the MMIC:

did not perceive its role as purely advisory but more so as an entity with inherent rights and entitlements derived from the Treaty of Waitangi; a viewpoint that asserted self-determination and the right to characterize Māori music, its challenges and solutions in tandem with directing negotiations with the Crown, the New Zealand Music Industry and other relevant bodies. (2009, 8)

This aim was thwarted, however, by the NZMIC. In much the same way that the New Zealand government refused to acknowledge separate Māori governance (despite provision being made for this in the Māori Representation Act 1867), the NZMIC countered the MMIC’s bid for autonomy. Former MMIC leader Hareruia Aperhama stated that the NZMIC ‘wanted to take control of the initiatives and the ideas ... to have control of the direction rather than empowering Māori to drive it’ (interview 1 February 2012). The NZMIC was not willing to allow the MMIC to exercise rangatiratanga (self-management) and limited their role to that of advocacy, needs analysis and advice brokerage (see Black et al 2004, 41-4). This role limitation has been criticised by indigenous commentators such as Karini, who stated, ‘the future of Māori music cannot exist as an extension of mainstream paternalism or ...[be] confined by the passivity of advisory contribution, necessitating a Māori worldview leadership and ... industry based autonomy’ (2009, 22).

The tensions that arose as a result of this conflict eventually made the working relationship between the NZMIC and MMIC untenable, and were a contributing factor in the MMIC’s dissolution in 2005. Aperahama (interview, 1 February 2012) believed the MMIC was ‘seen as too radical ... ask[ing] the hard questions and ma[king] people feel very, very uncomfortable when challenged about the position of Māori music, the Treaty in this country, policy development’. From Aperahama’s perspective, there were two choices: ‘to fold, compromise and let go of what our ethics, values and our important things are in order to fit in’, or ‘to do it ourselves and fund it ourselves, resource it ourselves and drive it ourselves’ (interview 1 February 2012). Compromising, or finding a negotiated middle ground, was not an option.

From 2005-2012, policy-making and support initiatives for the Māori music industry developed on an ad hoc basis, and key advocates working in this sphere tended to work in isolation. As Puatatangi’s Ngahiwi Apanui noted, ‘we [were] just not working together’ (Interview 3 February 2012). Aperahama corroborated this, saying,

All the sectors in the industry are isolated from each other, and therefore there’s no ... collective co-ordination ... [E]veryone seems to be working in their isolated pockets ... The music industry is spread wide and we’re not
To redress this lack of inter-agency co-ordination and communication, representatives from key stakeholder organisations, including the Māori Music Managers’ Development Initiative (3MDI), Te Puni Kōkiri, Creative New Zealand (CNZ), New Zealand On Air (NZOA) and Te Māngai Pāho (TMP) met during 2012-13 with the aim of formulating a common vision and goals for the Māori music industry and of defining key stakeholder roles in implementing them11 (interview 3 February 2012). While most members of this group are Māori, the group also includes Pākehā (New Zealand European) allied to the group’s kaupapa. As a result of these meetings (which were organised through Te Puni Kōkiri’s business facilitation service), Te Kāhui Pūoro Māori (TKPM) was formed.

This steering group has been delegated the task of facilitating, planning, and overseeing the delivery and monitoring of Te Rautaki Pūoro Māori (The Māori Music Strategy), which has now replaced the outdated strategy created by the MMIC in 2005. The TKPM’s key strategic goals are ‘to provide sustainable development pathways for all Māori musicians; to develop professional, culturally capable music professionals; to take Māori music to the world; to provide a roadmap that is flexible, practical and relevant in all parts of the Māori music industry; [and] to use contemporary tools to find solutions that benefit the Māori music whanau’ (Ngahiwi Apanui email 8 April 2015). The TKPM’s role also includes building relationships with government and related agencies to better support Māori music artists and professionals; making submissions on Bills that affect Māori music; and setting policy and standards for Māori music in partnership with the Māori music whānau (extended family) (interview 3 February 2012). As the group’s interim chairperson, Ngahiwi Apanui, stated,

> The idea is to work within the current infrastructure as much as we are able and utilise what we have achieved as a base to build a more robust and sustainable Māori music whānau (family/group) in Aotearoa that isn’t necessarily about finding the next Lorde or commercial success. (Interview 3 February 2012)

Whereas the MMIC uncompromisingly asserted desires for autonomy, TKPM appears to be based more around partnership and power-sharing. Its approach is co-operative rather than adversarial, in line with broader recent (post-MMP) shifts in Māori politics, which have seen a move towards the political centre and a renewed focus on changing existing systems and structures to benefit Māori from within rather than from without.12 At this stage, the extent to which the Māori members of TKPM will be able to exercise rangatiratanga and make decisions concerning the Māori popular music industry remains unclear and is the subject of ongoing negotiation with the government and government agencies.

Both the MMIC and TKPM’s approach has been very much based around Māori decision-making processes that are consultative in nature. Both groups have consulted
widely with Māori music industry participants before representing their views to various relevant government and industry stakeholders. Whereas, in New Zealand, Māori popular music strategies have been driven by Māori, the same has not been true in Australia. The Indigenous Contemporary Music Action Plan formulated in 2008 was driven not by Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander peoples, but by the Contemporary Music Development Working Group (CMDWG) of the Cultural Ministers Council. Although the CMDWG drew upon government reports from the past fifteen years that had been written in liaison with indigenous music industry participants, indigenous consultation was to take place after the plan’s implementation rather than during its formulation (Commonwealth of Australia 2008, 1, 11). Indigenous input has thus helped shape the plan’s ongoing development, but rather than fostering indigenous self-determination, a top-down approach to indigenous policy development has been employed wherein indigenous peoples remain peripheral to key decision-making processes concerning their popular music. This mirrors the Australian federal government’s shift away from self-determination in recent years, as well as Australian Aboriginal peoples’ much more limited degree of participation in the nation-state’s political apparatus, as compared with Māori.

The TKPM’s Māori music strategy advocates for a coordinated whole-of-sector approach involving stakeholder government agencies. Similarly, the CMDWG’s indigenous contemporary music action plan acknowledged a need for ‘greater strategic cooperation . . . between the Australian, state and territory governments and their agencies to ensure that initiatives complement and reinforce each other and that available resources are used in a targeted and focused manner’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2008, 6). In both countries, then, key government stakeholder agencies are, appropriately, cooperating and coordinating their activities in order to achieve the most efficient and effective use of resources, thereby avoiding role duplication. Significantly, the CMDWG opted for implementing a flexible approach, presenting jurisdictions with a range of possible solutions that could be tailored to their existing programs, budgets, etc. Initiatives arising from the Music Action Plan would be piloted for three years, whereupon those that had been successful would be considered as potential models for wider application (Commonwealth of Australia 2008, 4).

Indigenous popular music strategy development in Australia thus remains more ad hoc in comparison to New Zealand’s. While this could be read as a reflection of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders’ more marginal status with respect to the hegemon in comparison with Māori, it does have a pragmatic basis. Australia’s indigenous peoples are comparatively more culturally diverse and geographically dispersed, and comprise more of a minority group, than New Zealand’s. These factors have historically formed a key barrier to centralised indigenous policy-making in Australia. New Zealand’s comparative smallness, and the more limited number of key stakeholder agencies, are key factors that makes a centralised popular music strategy a more viable option for Māori. The attractiveness of this option lies in there being a single peak indigenous advocacy group that industry participants as well as government stakeholder bodies
can engage with. This central point of contact can: foster a sense of kotahitanga (unity) across the country’s diverse indigenous popular music industries; collate information from indigenous musicians about the challenges they face and work with government agencies collectively to find ways to overcome these; and provide an holistic perspective on indigenous popular music development. That said, a centralised strategy carries with it inherent challenges, not least in terms of how to respond to the needs of pluralistic indigenous music scenes (urban vs rural, and within and between tribes). While some common priorities may be identified within and across divergent scenes, competing aspirations will also exist. The TKPM will likely (like the CMDWG) need to consider implementing targeted, niche initiatives to help ensure support for the diverse range of Māori popular musics that exist.

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the differing extent of political participation and organisation among indigenous groups in each nation, with Māori having mobilised politically to a greater extent and having greater political influence than indigenous Australians, has been reflected in popular music advocacy in both nations. There have been two national Māori popular music advocacy bodies to date: the MMIC and TKPM. No comparable nation-wide advocacy body has yet formed in Australia. 17 The nearest comparable body is the Songlines Aboriginal Music Corporation, which was formed in 1996 to represent and advocate for indigenous musicians in the State of Victoria. 18 Although Songlines has an online presence, 19 its scope and influence are primarily limited to that State.

**Case Study Two: National Arts Funding Bodies**

Like the development of indigenous popular music strategies, national arts funding bodies (which have been significant sources of support for indigenous popular music) are also arenas for the contestation of power in postcolonial Australia and New Zealand. While both Australia’s and New Zealand’s national arts bodies, the Australia Council for the Arts (ACA) and Creative New Zealand (CNZ), were modelled on the Arts Council of Great Britain, both have implemented measures to decolonise their structures and discourses. Indigenous representatives have been included within both nations’ arts funding bodies, and the governance structures of both organisations have (historically at least) contained bodies working specifically to support and promote indigenous arts. By comparing and contrasting these measures, we can chart how organisational changes relate to broader cultural-political shifts in the relationship between indigenous and hegemonic cultural groups.

CNZ’s structure and policies have become more accommodating of treaty principles over time. Created in an attempt to reconcile significant differences between the English and te reo Māori versions of the Treaty of Waitangi, and to reinforce its relevance and meaning in contemporary contexts, the Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi were adopted by Prime Minister David Lange’s Labour government in 1989. Three of these principles are of particular relevance to this
discussion: the Kāwanatanga Principle, which acknowledges the Crown’s right to govern and create laws; the Rangatiratanga Principle, which makes the above conditional on the Crown’s acknowledgement of Māori authority and control in relation to the resources and taonga (treasures) Māori wish to retain; and the Principle of Cooperation, which foregrounds both duality (distinctive cultural development) and unity (common purpose and community). These principles have been subsequently adopted in legislation (Hayward 2012).

Although established in 1963 as an ‘arms length’ arts funding agency, it was not until 1978—following the passing of the Queen Elizabeth the Second Arts Council of New Zealand Act 1974—that the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council of New Zealand established the Council for Māori and South Pacific Arts, a sub-agency controlled by the Council. Its establishment, three years after the passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, reflected the Crown’s growing recognition of its responsibilities towards Māori under the Treaty of Waitangi, enabling Māori to exercise rangatiratanga with respect to their arts by making Māori arts funding decisions. With this sub-agency remaining under Arts Council’s control, however, the dominant position of Pākehā was preserved.

The Arts Council of New Zealand Toi Aotearoa Act 1994, which established CNZ as a Crown entity, resulted in another restructure, one that was highly significant in symbolic terms. Recognising the bicultural partnership between Māori and Pākehā at the heart of the Treaty of Waitangi, the new structure consisted of two boards governed by an Arts Council: the Arts Board (with its subsidiary entity, the Pacific Arts Committee), and Te Waka Toi (the Māori Arts Board). We can see the Crown addressing the Treaty of Waitangi and the treaty principles here. The former board marks the Crown’s fulfillment of its agreement to protect ‘O rātou taonga katoa’ (all their valued customs and possessions) in the Māori version of Article II of the Treaty, which, it can be argued, includes the arts. The latter relates to the upholding of the rangatiratanga principle. Rather than grouping New Zealand’s Māori and Pacific Islander peoples together (at that time, New Zealand’s most significant ethnic minorities), the status of Māori as tangata whenua (people of the land; the autochthonous people of Aotearoa) was recognised as being distinct from that of later immigrant groups. An emphasis on partnership was reaffirmed with CNZ’s implementation of its Partnering with Māori Strategy in 2008. The outcomes of this strategy (including Māori cultural awareness and te reo Māori training for all staff) are highlighted in CNZ’s annual reports dating from 2010-11.

The passing of the Arts Council of New Zealand Toi Aotearoa Act 2014 resulted in yet another restructure, combining the two arts boards into a single Arts Council comprising thirteen board members. Four places on the board are reserved for Māori, two for Pacific Islanders, and the remaining places are not ethnically tagged. Although the Māori and Pacific Islander board representatives combined cannot form a majority, in demographic terms the proportion of Māori to non-Māori on the board could be considered generous (30.8% of the proposed board members being Māori, compared to
Māori comprising 15% of total New Zealand population according to the latest census (Statistics New Zealand 2013)). With this board make-up, Māori are now less siloed than in past structures. Importantly, the entire board is responsible for determining CNZ’s strategic direction, priorities, policy framework, and funding allocation decisions. Unlike previous structures, which saw Māori exercising autonomy over Māori arts, the latest structure enables them to influence the direction of the nation’s arts, mirroring the post-MMP Māori political shift from the sidelines into a position of national influence. This structure maintains Māori rangatiratanga, whilst also better reflecting the treaty principle of co-operation (which emphasises both duality and unity) than past structures. It represents a movement away from separatism, increasing the potential for mutual benefit and creating an environment in which indigenous knowledges, perspectives and experiences can permeate the entire organisation. Symbolically, this structure signifies a reconciled and unified nation—albeit a nation in which the duality between Māori and Pākehā is recognised, and in which Māori remain a minority group. It is part of a broader recent movement towards the implementation of co-management frameworks and institutions,23 a shift very much in line with that advocated in the Waitangi Tribunal’s report on the WAI262 claim (Waitangi Tribunal 2011).24

CNZ’s Māori Arts Report recognised this shift, with their previous motto ‘by Māori, for Māori and the world’ being changed to ‘by Māori, for Aotearoa and the world’ (Creative New Zealand 2012b, 16). Rather than focusing on a Māori (first) nation, the revised motto refers to the more inclusive New Zealand nation. This movement away from the periphery and into the centre addresses an issue raised by one interviewee, chair of an indigenous music body:

One of the problems with Māori music is that we have been a bit insular, and that’s not because we’re saying ‘F the world’ or anything like that, it’s just because we’ve got our heads down, we’re all busy people. (Interview 18 December 2009)

However, that one of the suggestions offered in the report consultation process was ‘by Māori, for Māori, for OUR [capitalisation in original] world’ (Creative New Zealand 2012b, 6) indicates that views such as those expressed in the above section by Aperahama and Karini retain currency in some quarters. It is clear that Māori opinion remains divided as to whether rangatiratanga should be exercised separately from or in association with the Pākehā political apparatus. Desires for autonomy and separation continue to war with desires for state support and engagement.

Australia’s national arts funding body introduced indigenous arts funding mechanisms several years earlier than CNZ did. Funding for Aboriginal arts commenced in 1970, when the Australian Council for the Arts (ACA)25 established an Aboriginal Arts Advisory Committee; this occurred only two years after the ACA’s establishment, and three years after the constitutional referendum giving the Australian government the
ability to legislate with respect to Australia’s indigenous peoples. When the interim Arts Council was established in 1973, the Aboriginal Arts Board (later renamed the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Arts Board, ATSIAB) became one of its seven founding boards, gaining statutory authority with the passing of the Australia Council Act 1975. Although the Labor government was changing its indigenous policy from assimilation to self-determination at this time, this policy shift took time to take full effect within the ACA. While all Aboriginal Arts Board members were indigenous Australians, the board’s first two directors (Bob Edwards, 1973-80; Alan West, 1980-83) were non-indigenous; the board itself therefore remained under the overall control of members of the hegemonic social group. Following the end of West’s term as director, the board determined in 1983 that it would have indigenous-only staff, achieving this goal two years later.26

From the 1990s and into the first decade of the 2000s, calls for reconciliation became prominent in Australian political discourses.27 In response, the ACA adopted its National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Arts policy in 1997, a set of principles (of respect, authority, rights, responsibilities and diversity) that guide its activities to ensure they are appropriate to Australia’s indigenous communities. In 1990, the Council signalled its development of a Reconciliation Plan (Australia Council 1990); this plan was internally finalised by 2009 (Australia Council 2009, 19)—the year after Prime Minister Rudd’s public apology to members of the Stolen Generations.28 By 2013, the first cultural awareness training for staff was undertaken under the Plan, and the indigenous welcome and acknowledgements protocol for Council-hosted events initiated at the Plan’s inception became policy.

The heightened importance given to indigenous self-determination was reflected in the ACA’s 2008 restructure; the ATSIAB was retained, becoming one of five divisions supported by the office of the CEO. This situation changed, however, with the ACA’s most recent restructure, which took place in 2015. Although Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people still undertake peer-review of indigenous arts applications and are thus able to exert a measure of control over the direction of their arts, ATSIAB has now been removed from the ACA’s governance structure.

So around the time that Māori representatives gained hitherto unprecedented decision-making powers within CNZ, indigenous Australians lost their representation at the ACA’s governance level, marking a move from the core back to the periphery. Māori empowerment alongside Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander disempowerment within these national arts funding bodies mirrors their respective waxing and waning power in the broader political sphere. The political trajectories of Australia’s and New Zealand’s indigenous peoples are clearly at present following divergent paths, and this is being reflected in the governance of national arts (including music) funding bodies.
Conclusion

As Wilson and Stewart (2008: 3) note, ‘Indigenous peoples have long had an ambivalent relationship with the mass media . . . [I]ndustrialized, mass-produced messages and images—and accompanying technologies—in most cases have represented the perspectives, values and institutional structures of empire’. What this article has shown is that, in Australia and New Zealand, the ‘perspectives, values and institutional structures’ of the British Empire—as seen in national government interventions in indigenous popular music industries in both nations—have gradually become more inclusive regarding indigenous decision-makers, indigenous decision-making processes, and indigenous cultural imperatives. While this shift has taken quite different forms in Australia and New Zealand, it reflects the ambition of both nations’ indigenous peoples for self-determination, and for cultural recognition against and within the hegemon. That said, government policy and law-making with respect to popular music industries remains a site of contemporary cultural and socio-political struggle.

The state’s relationship with its indigenous peoples in each nation has differed significantly, with Māori having a much longer history of engagement with western political processes and of constitutional standing with respect to western Europeans compared to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. In the arena of nation-state politics, Aboriginal peoples, although represented, remain sidelined and have little or no real political power or influence; in contrast, Māori political power and influence has increased markedly since MMP’s introduction in the mid-1990s. In recent years, Australia’s indigenous peoples have become more marginalised and disempowered, while Māori have become more powerful within mainstream New Zealand politics.

The political relationship between Australia’s and New Zealand’s indigenous peoples and the State has had a significant role in shaping indigenous popular music’s fate in both nations. In this article, the development of indigenous popular music strategies in New Zealand and Australia, as well as the decision-making power of indigenous peoples in national arts funding bodies, have been used as case studies to examine how these broader political shifts are reflected in government agency interventions in indigenous popular music industries.

In Australia, the indigenous popular music strategy has not been driven by Australia’s indigenous peoples and, despite the implementation of decolonising strategies, indigenous power within the ACA is diminishing. In contrast, Māori are driving New Zealand’s indigenous contemporary music strategy and are currently playing a significant governance role within CNZ, not just with respect to Māori arts but the nation’s arts as a whole. Tensions remain within Māori communities as to whether rangatiratanga should be exercised separately from, or in association with, the Pākehā political system, and these tensions continue to be played out in contemporary political arenas, including those relating to popular music. Government agency interventions in
indigenous popular music industries thus constitute a microcosm of broader struggles between indigenous empowerment and hegemonic control that have taken place.

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Notes
1. These interventions can occur in a wide variety of policy areas, including arts funding (music recordings, live tours, awards ceremonies), intellectual property, broadcasting, export development (overseas promotion, free trade agreements, parallel importing laws), education (within institutions, as well as through professional development and mentoring), heritage maintenance, urban planning (arts infrastructure), and health and wellbeing. They can have significant impacts on popular musicians and audiences, creatively, commercially and culturally. Although a discussion of specific indigenous popular music interventions in Australia and New Zealand lies beyond the scope of this article, information about arts funding, broadcasting and intellectual property in these contexts can be found in Homan, Cloonan and Cattermole (2016).
2. Australia became a dominion in 1901, and New Zealand in 1907. There is a significant difference between these dominions, however. While the entire nation of New Zealand was recognised as a dominion, in Australia the dominion comprised a federation of six colonies. These colonies became States when Australia gained dominion status, collectively becoming the Commonwealth of Australia.
3. In Australia, 2.5% of the population identified as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander in 2011; in New Zealand, 15% of the population identified as Māori in 2013 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012; Statistics New Zealand 2013).
4. These interviews were semi-structured, where some questions had been determined in advance but other areas of inquiry could be explored depending on how the interview developed. Interviews for Policy Notes took place in both Australia and New Zealand in 2009, whereas those for Māori and Pacific Islander music policy development in Aotearoa/New Zealand took place in New Zealand in 2012. It is important to note that the article has been written by a non-indigenous researcher (a Pākehā New Zealander, or New Zealander of western European descent), and is therefore shaped by that researcher’s background, experiences, motivations, biases and so on. Where possible, excerpts from interviews with indigenous people have been used so that their voices and perspectives are represented. Interviewees for the former project were guaranteed anonymity, and are therefore represented in this article by their occupation and (indirectly) their employer; those for the latter project consented to being identified.
5. In New Zealand and Australia, the assimilationist agenda remained in place until the early 1970s, when there was a government turn towards policies of indigenous self-determination. By this time, the indigenous peoples of both nations had long histories of struggle to maintain and revitalise their customs, languages and traditional rights and laws, as well as to regain control over their own destinies. International progressive social movements drawing attention to Black civil rights and the rights of women drew attention to the plight of other oppressed groups, including indigenous peoples. As indigenous rights activism and cultural revitalisation movements strengthened, governments became more receptive to calls for indigenous self-determination.
6. Section 74 of this Act provided for certain districts within New Zealand to be set apart, wherein Māori laws, customs and usages could be maintained ‘for the Government of
themselves, in all their relations and dealings with each other’, provided these were ‘not repugnant to general principles of humanity’. This clause provided some legal basis for later separatist movements Kaupapa Māori (the King movement) and Te Kōtahitanga (the Māori parliament). Māori self-government was never recognised by the New Zealand government, however, leaving participation in parliament as the only viable means to exercise political power (New Zealand Parliament 2009).

7. The term rangatira means ‘chief,’ and the nominalising suffix –tanga turns the word into an abstract noun. The use of tino before rangatiratanga acts as an intensifier of the noun. The term rangatiratanga was used in the 1835 Declaration of Independence to refer to New Zealand’s independence. In the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, the term tino rangatiratanga was used as a translation of the English phrase, ‘full exclusive and undisputed possession’. For Māori signatories, however, the term literally meant the ‘absolute/unqualified exercise of chieftainship,’ carrying with it (in line with its usage in the Declaration) notions of independence, self-determination, self-government, autonomy and control. Tino rangatiratanga has also been translated as ‘sovereignty’ (see http://www.maoridictionary.co.nz/search?&keywords=rangatiratanga), but this usage is highly problematic. The treaty uses kawanatanga as a translation of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘sovereign authority’, but this term was commonly understood as ‘governorship’ by the treaty’s Māori signatories at the time (see http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/treaty/read-the-Treaty/differences-between-the-texts). The terms Kingitanga or mana (used in the Declaration as translations of ‘sovereign power’ and ‘authority/control’ respectively) might have been more appropriate, but at that time the notion of a paramount ruler of the entire country would still have been foreign to rangatira used to exercising authority over their own tribal areas. Because the Māori version of the treaty only ceded kawanatanga to the Crown, ‘Māori understandings of self-determination do not always accept that control, and the mechanisms necessary for the exercise of control, have ever been abandoned’ (Durie 1998, 3). These significant differences between the English and Māori versions of the treaty have remained the topic of ongoing debate, and remain an ongoing source of tension.

8. Aperahama (interview, 1 February 2012) also cited inadequate funding, as well as members losing their passion and drive and being unable to sustain the time commitment involved as contributing factors.

9. Aperahama (interview 1 February 2012) saw iwi runanga (tribal authorities) as being significant potential investors in the creative sector, but when he approached them while he was chair of the MMIC, ‘they weren’t ready yet to invest in it’. Iwi investment in popular music would lessen artists’ dependency on the State.

10. 3MDI was formed in 2012 by two members of the Music Managers’ Forum (MMF), Ninakaye Taane-Tinorau and Wairere Iti, in response to a perception that the MMF was ‘essentially a white organization that dealt for white people’ (Wairere Iti, interview 27 January 2012). It aims to find ways to better support and nurture Māori music managers. The group initiated and facilitated a highly successful public Facebook discussion on this topic, and also presented their ideas at Sounds Aotearoa 2012, an important annual advocacy forum and showcase for the Māori music industry.

11. This group is separate from the Contemporary Popular Music Working Group (which focuses on the New Zealand music industry more broadly), but there is some overlap in terms of stakeholder participation.

12. The Electoral Reform Act 1993 introduced Mixed Member Proportional parliamentary representation, replacing the First-Past-the-Post system. Prior to this time, there were significant concerns regarding the effectiveness of Māori representation in Parliament, to the point where ‘a mistrust of Parliament as an effective means of advancing Māori interests developed’ (Durie 1998, 96) and Māori planned to boycott the 1993 election. The 1996 general election marked a watershed moment for Māori politics: a record number (63%) of Māori voted; a record number of Māori candidates (15) gained seats in parliament; and Māori MPs were crucial in determining the make-up of the coalition.
government, which subsequently included a record number of Māori members in cabinet (Durie 1998, 96-110). Far from moving towards political autonomy and disengagement with Pākehā political processes, Māori ‘opted for a strong Māori presence within the system,’ using the election as a ‘serious bid to capture the mainstream and to locate Māori at the political centre’ (Durie 1998, 110). Since MMP’s introduction, the number of Māori seats has increased (from four between 1867-1993 to five in the 1996 election, six in the 1999 election, and seven in all subsequent elections to date). Currently, Māori remain affiliated to a wide range of mainstream parties, rather than throwing their support unanimously behind the Māori Party (established in 2004), the only Māori party with members in the House of Representatives at present.

13. The CMC ceased operating in 2011. Since 2012, its work has continued under the aegis of the Meeting of Cultural Ministers.

14. For example, the Northern Territory National Emergency response implemented under Prime Minister John Howard in 2007 (subsequently replaced by Stronger Futures policy and legislation in 2011) has been criticised for being racially discriminatory and for infringing on indigenous people’s human rights. More recently, the withdrawal of federal government funding from 150 Western Australian remote indigenous communities in March 2015 on the basis that taxpayers should not (according to Liberal Prime Minister Tony Abbott) be funding people’s ‘lifestyle choices’ has brought into question government recognition of the deep spiritual, cultural and physical connections between Aboriginal peoples and country (Martin and Owens 2015). The struggle for indigenous self-determination, understanding and recognition continues.

15. Indigenous Australians did not gain universal franchise until the passing of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1962 (although voting did not become compulsory, as it was for other Australians, until the passing of the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Act 1983), whereas all Māori could vote by 1893. Māori have been involved in the nation’s governance since 1872, whereas an Aboriginal person did not take a seat in parliament until 1971. New Zealand’s indigenous parties date from the late 1970s, and in 2004 the first member of a Māori party was elected to parliament. While political parties dedicated to indigenous Australian interests have formed since the early 1990s, no members of these parties have been elected; their political influence therefore remains negligible. The Australian federal government was unable to legislate with respect to indigenous Australians until the constitution was changed following the 1967 referendum called by Liberal Prime Minister Harold Holt. Australia’s constitution still contains no explicit recognition of the status and rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and Australia remains the only democratic nation in the world with a constitution that authorises racial discrimination (Recognise 2015). Unlike Australia, New Zealand does not have a codified constitution. However, Māori became subject to the rights and protections of British law with the signing of the treaty in 1840. The treaty is regarded as the nation’s founding document.

16. The CMDWG’s Breakthrough: The Emerging Indigenous Contemporary Musicians Initiative, a key outcome of the Indigenous Contemporary Music Action Plan, was judged a success (see http://mcm.arts.gov.au/sites/default/files/communique-9-october-2009.pdf). Three funding rounds were held (one per annum in 2009, 2010 and 2011). The scheme ceased operating with the CMC’s demise, and has not been continued by the Meeting of Cultural Ministers.

17. The Torres Strait Islander Arts Board funds the National Indigenous Arts Advocacy Association, but this is an inter-arts agency rather than being music-specific.

18. It runs events showcasing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander artists as well as support and development programs for emerging and established artists (Songlines Aboriginal Music 2015).

19. See https://www.facebook.com/songlinesmusic

20. Creative New Zealand funding is provided by the New Zealand Lottery Grants Board and the Ministry for Culture and Heritage. Arts, Culture and Heritage funding accounts for
approximately 36% of Creative New Zealand’s revenue, with Lottery funding contributing approximately 62%. The remainder comes from revenue from other government agencies, interest and rental income (Creative New Zealand 2011: 10).

21. The term bicultural, in the New Zealand context, refers specifically to Māori and Pākehā cultures. Māori are the nation’s indigenous/aboriginal peoples. The term Pākehā, while sometimes used to refer to all non-Māori New Zealanders, is more commonly used in a more specific sense to refer to members of New Zealand’s hegemonic social group: New Zealanders of European (particularly British) descent.

22. With the signing of the treaty, the Crown gained the right to govern Māori subject to certain guarantees. Māori became subject to, and protected by, British laws, gaining the full rights and privileges of British subjects, and the Crown gained the right to legislate with respect to Māori – 127 years earlier than in Australia. These mutual rights and obligations, embodied in the treaty, provided the basis for New Zealand’s bicultural political framework.

23. Although denied the exercise of tino rangatiratanga, in recent years, co-management bodies such as the Waikato River Authority have allowed Māori some exercise of rangatiratanga with respect to the management of natural resources. In their report on the WAI 262 claim, the Waitangi Tribunal (2011) recommended that this co-management approach, which epitomises the spirit of Māori-Pākehā partnership underpinning the treaty, be extended to cultural as well as natural resources.

24. This report calls for the post-colonial relationship between Māori and Pākehā to shift away from a focus on the redress of grievances and towards genuine partnership and power-sharing. It advocates not for a relationship built on the notion that Pākehā must pay for the colonial sins committed against Māori by their forebears, but for a relationship of mutual advantage that takes place on mutually agreed terms, as equals, where Māori agency, autonomy and rights are respected. Importantly, the tribunal (Waitangi Tribunal 2011, xxiv) advocated a whole-of-government, bicultural approach to policy and law-making, noting ‘What we saw and heard in sittings over many years left us in no doubt that unless it is accepted that New Zealand has two founding cultures, not one; unless Māori culture and identity are valued in everything government says and does; and unless they are welcomed into the very centre of the way we do things in this country, nothing will change. Māori will continue to be perceived, and know they are perceived, as an alien and resented minority, a problem to be managed with a seemingly endless stream of taxpayer-funded programmes, but never solved’. In short, the tribunal advocates for the consideration of Māori ways of thinking and doing in policy-making processes. It may not always be possible to achieve consensus, but it is important that these discussions take place, that compromises on both sides are accepted, and that policy-making no longer remains monocultural (i.e. Pākehā).

25. This non-statutory body was set up in 1968 as a division of the Prime Minister’s Department.

26. All Te Waka Toi appointees, in contrast, have been Māori. The Council for Māori and South Pacific Arts, which existed prior, comprised a mixture of Māori and NZ Pacific Islanders.

27. A Motion of Reconciliation, drafted by Prime Minister John Howard, was passed in 1999, and Prime Minister Kevin Rudd publicly apologised to members of the Stolen Generations in 2008. Unlike New Zealand, however, there has been no formal mechanism implemented for the redress of indigenous grievances similar to the Waitangi Tribunal.

28. The term Stolen Generations refers to indigenous children who were forcibly removed from their families and placed with white families from the 1900s-1960s as part of the Australian government’s assimilationist project.

29. The data for this article derives from two research projects: an Australian Research Council-funded project titled Policy notes: Local popular music in global creative economies, and a University of Otago Humanities Research Grant-funded project titled Māori and Pacific Islander music policy development in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The author was research assistant on the former project (which was led by Associate Professor Shane...
Homan and Professor Martin Cloonan; Associate Professor Roy Shuker was also an investigator on this project, but discontinued his involvement upon retiring from academia), and sole researcher on the latter. Policy Notes examined music policy formation and debates in Australia, New Zealand and Scotland, and aimed to investigate the effectiveness of music policy settings and historical shifts in policy practice; assist in planning the needs of music producers, audiences and governments; and contribute to wider contemporary debates about the role of popular music within cultural policy. The latter project aimed to identify New Zealand national government initiatives to support the Māori and Pasifikan popular music industries, explore how and why these policies developed and changed over time, and evaluate their effectiveness and utility.

References


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