Tensions and Symmetries in the Ethnographic Unconscious: 
Lacan, *Rain of the Children*, Cross-Cultural Trauma

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Abstract
This paper is situated at the intersection of a number of tensions: the registers of psyche and culture, psychoanalysis and anthropology, colonial and post-colonial, mediation and re-representation. Drawing on Vincent Ward’s *Rain of the Children* (2008), it proposes a move from a perspective inflected through western epistemes articulated by psychoanalysts such as Lacan to one situated within non-western perspectives. Such perspectives have recently been explored in a variety of fields such as ethnography and STS in a quest to investigate and rework existing, largely western distinctions. Yet such social science approaches are either ambivalent or silent on how psychoanalysis, the unconscious and the constitution of self are reconfigured within these shifting frames of cultural reference. This is the central question for the paper. These issues are further highlighted where difficult questions of suffering emerge, as displayed by the cross-cultural and postcolonial trauma in Ward’s film. Consequently, a key epistemic conundrum emerges in how to engage such diverse cultural perspective when dominant western paradigms are brought into question; the paper illuminates the theoretical and experiential tensions this bring into view.

Introduction
This paper suggests a different way to approach mediations of the Real. It does so by being situated at the intersection of a number of tensions: the registers of psyche and culture (Stitou 2016), psychoanalysis and anthropology, colonial and postcolonial, mediation and re-representation, visual and aural. What it proposes is a move from a perspective inflected through the kinds of Western epistemes articulated, for example by Lacan (1977), to one that acknowledges and articulates non-Western perspectives (Serafini n.d.). Recently, these have been explored by Laplantine (2014), Law, John & Wen-Yuan Lin. 2009 (2016) and

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others, each drawing on substantial debates within recent ethnography that undo and rework conventional distinctions. Yet, these debates are within the social sciences and, themselves, are often ambivalent or silent on the notion of both the unconscious or clinical work, despite these directly engaging cross-cultural trauma experience (Proudfoot 2015). Where writers, such as Lacan or Zizek (2006), have discussed the unconscious, a further difficulty arises: the discussion is often developed through an implicitly Western discourse (Stitou 2016) with universalising assumptions that themselves are at issue. In contrast, this paper argues that a dynamic, non-Cartesian unconscious quite variably configured across cultures involves fluid, embodied, sensory, culturally specific practices. *Rain of the Children* is one local illustration that highlights the tensions in question. Drawing on recent work in ethnopsychoanalysis (Sturm et al. 2010), the paper discusses the co-construction of meaning around the unconscious that such tensions foreground.

For this reason, I start with Vincent Ward’s evocative essay film, *Rain of the Children*. The film attempts to engage with postcolonial trauma through Ward’s personal interactions with its Tuhoi subjects, Puhi and Niki. Yet the film articulates a series of parallel narratives: double time frames – colonial trauma and current understandings – that itself enfolds two historically distinct films Ward made twenty-five years apart. The films, one inside the other, employ parallel registers: ethnographic documentary in the first, docudrama enactments in the second; Ward as participant observer in the first, Ward’s non-diegetic address directly to long-dead Puhi, in the second.

Within the film itself is an unresolved issue which is the focus of this paper: how to understand and address suffering situated and expressed within profoundly different cultural horizons. In Ward’s film, Puhi’s son, Niki, is seen as suffering psychotic symptoms; yet, within a Māori perspective, he and his mother are suffering from *mākutu*, which Ward describes as a curse. This starkly non-Western frame of reference is common in anthropology (Mimica 2006, Kohn 2013, Descola 2014), and has prompted intensive discussion about how to reconcile Western and non-Western epistemologies (e.g. Gruber 2013, Descola 2014).

What this paper asks, though, is a different question. What would it be to think not through the Western but the ethnographic unconscious? To do so requires recasting what we understand by the term itself. To ask such a question also involves a reflexive turn, where interrogation is not simply of the exotic other but brings anthropology – and psychoanalysis – home (Strathern 1987). This is the challenge posed, in effect, by *Rain of the Children* where its Māori subjects are not in fact the ethnographic other; instead, Ward’s ethnographic gaze, and voice, is equally on himself, his history, their history, our history as joint subjects under the Treaty of Waitangi, with the contested co-production of a postcolonial relationship mediated through the visual.
Beginning from this point, the paper explores alternative formulations of the unconscious and its different modes of organisation across cultures. It ends by looking at the difficulty of reconstruing Western practices through a non-Western frame, utilising Law and Lin’s recent work (2010, 2011, 2015, 2017a-c) on disconcertments and the ‘provincialising’ the Western practices of science and technology studies with the difficult issues of postcoloniality, symmetry and method they bring to bear. This proposal to think ‘symmetrically’ has provoked considerable comment about its feasibility (Kuo 2017); for my purpose it, equally, raises questions about how far symmetrical thinking about the unconscious is equally possible.

Rain of the Children

Vincent Ward’s 2008 film Rain of the Children traces, through the prism of two central figures, Puhi and Niki, the suffering experienced by Tūhoe people in the 1908 government raids on the Rua Kenana’s Maungapōhatu settlement in the Ureweras. As Fisher and Hokowhitu (2013, 67) comment, ‘The narrative constructed by Kenana and his followers is one of the most extraordinary stories of third culture created by Indigenous leaders navigating New Zealand’s early postcolonial landscape’. The film eloquently portrays personal, collective and colonial trauma linked through Ward’s attempts, twice in two different films, to understand this suffering. This mākutu, Ward describes as a curse:

The idea of the curse runs thematically throughout the film, referring not only to Puhi’s plight but also to the general succumbing of Indigenous people to colonial disease. The film’s exploration of the mākutu focuses on its causes and means of transmission, as well as the interpretation of the experiences associated with its affliction. Ward describes how disease became a tacit means of genocide within colonisation. He points out that because even medical science at that time could not explain why Māori were so much more susceptible to diseases introduced by Pakeha, Māori tended to interpret the phenomena as "punishment for some sin." In the case of Rua Kenana, his understanding of the supernatural was already a synergistic product of the colonial encounter with Western religion. (Fisher and Hokowhitu 2013, 67)

As Fisher and Hokowhitu (2013, 65) note, ‘the film treats mākutu “as a confrontation of incommensurable epistemes”’. Indeed, it is an attempt to negotiate numerous frames of reference. Of interest here is the tension between clinical and indigenous understandings of suffering and its implications. As one Tūhoe interlocutor comments in the film:

When you talk about patupaiarehe [fairies/spirits], we're talking about in Niki’s case having a mental illness. We're talking about a person who hallucinates and hears voices. That's when he was getting sick from a Westernised perspective of the illness. But from a Māori perspective of the
illness, he would actually see those things as being real, and so it would be
cross-spoken with the elders who would understand that patupaiarehe, or
fairies as such, were real things.

Consequently, a ‘Western’ clinical perspective portrays Niki as schizophrenic, suffering
from a mental illness, and his mother as psychotic in her obsessive, whispered mutterings.
The other, a Māori perspective, calls instead on indigenous practice, the spirit worlds of
patupaiarehe, and Niki’s special gifts. Ward also comes to understand that Puhi’s
mutterings are prayers and invocations against a curse placed on her that recall her
community’s initial trauma, her own abuse within her whanau, and the suffering she has
carried, both personally and collectively, over the following decades. These are the
incommensurable epistemes to which Fisher and Hokowhitu (2013) refer.

Within a Western perspective, these events and their consequences could be understood,
for example, through Lacanian psychoanalysis and the concept of the Real. In this context,
the Real represents the traumatic kernel of the Symbolic: here, the Real profoundly
disrupts the Symbolic – the ordered chains of signifiers – at both collective and individual
levels (Žižek 2006, 72). The Real in the context of the film is unsymbolisable: Puhi’s
mutterings can be understood as persistent, unsuccessful attempts to articulate the
inaarticulable of trauma that she, her whanau and people have suffered (and see Leader,
2003, on Lacan and the voice as the Real of trauma).² Similarly, Ward’s film is, itself,
an attempt to symbolise not only trauma but the Other, crossing the cultural divide in an effort
to suture the colonial trauma underlying the film’s genesis. The film essay shifts constantly
between the realms of Lacan’s Imaginary and Symbolic, attempting to articulate through
personal address, dramatised reconstruction, evocative images and poetic sequences those
very aspects that elude symbolisation.

Another way to describe this is to say that Ward’s film, itself, is caught in other chains of
signifiers and sets of tensions. As Kodre (2011, 55) puts it, ‘we have, on the one hand, the
Freudian, classic, psychoanalytical tradition and, on the other, its spin-off interpretations,
linguo-structuralist, Lacanian, being one of them, so we also have two different encounters
of anthropological theory with psychoanalysis’. Kodre’s paper is a recent attempt to revisit
the relationship between ‘the two impossible disciplines’, psychoanalysis and anthropology
(Kodre 2011, 52). Yet his own paper sits squarely within the frame of a Western ontology
just at the moment it investigates the otherness that is a core focus of anthropology. Kodre
emphasises the universality of a Lacanian perspective, founded in the triad of Real, Symbolic and Imaginary, and implies it is applicable across all cultural systems. He does so
by an emphasis on logocentrism (language as ‘the house of Being’, Heidegger 1998, 254)
central to the influential linguistic anthropology of Whorf (1940) and Sapir (1994), and in
Levi-Strauss’s (1963, 1969) work, with its emphasis on Freudian and universalising
theories around the incest taboo.
Ward’s film and the perspective of indigenous spirit worlds set up a profound challenge to this ontology, by resituating it as simply one account or discourse in relation to other, equally valid ones. Whilst this challenge is made within a bicultural framework, it echoes similar tensions expressed across other cultural systems as a radical alterity (Graeber 2015, Laidlaw 2012, Pedersen 2012, Viveiros de Castro 2013, 2015). I return to these issues in more detail below, but it is enough to summarise them by way of David Graeber’s comments (2015, 5-6) about how we might understand another culture’s reality, such as the Merina’s belief in magical powers:

one which “we Westerners” will never be able to completely understand, and one to which our own familiar categories like the fetish do not apply. In other words, there are only two permissible ways to problematise our own assumptions*: either one can accept and try to come to grips with the radical alterity of “native” concepts, and consider the implications of treating them as a form of reality (but a reality that exists only for this one particular group of “natives”), or one can come to accept the general theoretical framework promulgated by proponents of the “ontological turn”.

Within the bicultural relations of Aotearoa New Zealand, such a designation of Māori as ‘natives’, who are simultaneously contemporary citizens, is confronting and potentially offensive; at the same time, it reproduces precisely the tension this paper examines between the way self and other is constituted and articulated. Graeber’s comments point to how the typical ethnographic assembling and reassembling of sociocultural entities and practices takes place, from which Western anthropologists, including Graeber, are not excluded. As Strathern comments, ‘Cultures are everywhere interpreted as hybrid amalgams, whether of an indigenous kind or as the effect of exposure to one another’. As Mol (2016, 402) comments, ‘Strathern tells stories about others so as to turn us into just one particular cultural group among many more’. She adds, Strathern insists that ‘our perceptions are marked by “cultural subjectivity” and argues that we should be next to (rather than above) all the “others” whom anthropologists describe’. Strathern (1996, 522) herself draws on Latour to note that:

Latour’s own symmetrical vision brings together not only human and nonhuman in the ordering of social life, but also insights from both modern and premodern societies. And that is the purpose of his democratising negative, We have never been modern (1993). Moderns divide society from technology, culture from nature, human from nonhuman, except that they do not – Euro-American moderns are like anyone else in the hybrids they make, even though they are rarely as explicit.
However, this paper goes one step further; following Law and Lin (2015) when they draw on STS to argue ‘for forms of postcolonial investigation that use non-Western analytical resources. Their major concern is to ask ‘what might happen if STS were to make more systematic use of non-Western ideas’ (2015, n.p.).

This is also the issue with the non-Western, or the ethnographic, unconscious. How might it reformulate the Western, Freudian version of the unconscious as promulgated for instance by Lacan; indeed, is it a thinkable project? This is the claim made by the speakers in Ward’s film and is what I take up in the next section.

**Ethnographic Unconscious**

The standard account of the unconscious derives from Freud with his emphasis on the Oedipus complex as a universal phenomenon. This emerges as early as 1897 in a letter to Fliess where he defines it as a ‘universal event in early childhood’.

But whether the phenomenon is, in fact, universal has long been subject to doubt (e.g. Bhugra and Bhui 2010). There is broad agreement that parent-child and sibling-sibling incestuous unions are almost universally forbidden (Rosman et al. 2009, 101). Yet, Freud’s ideological, geographical and socially-situated perspective has attracted frequent commentary (Bourdieu 2004, Erebun 2005, 14). Nonetheless, an extensive and recent literature explores fieldwork from within the frame of Western psychoanalysis. Proudfoot (2016, 1139) in one summary notes pointedly, however, ‘that much of what occurs in ethnographic research takes place outside conscious awareness’.

If such research takes place within a Western framework, the Oedipus Complex, central to the Freudian position, been perceived as intensely problematic. One key battleground has been around its supposed universality (Smadja 2011), a disagreement that began with Malinowski’s early dispute around matrilineal societies. Merkur (2005, 7-11) details other concerns, ranging from Freud’s emphasis on the child over the parents’ fantasies, or doubts about how to interpret Sophocles’ play from which the Oedipus myth itself is taken. Stitou (2016) traces other concerns, including the belief that ‘Buddhist and Islamic cultures supposedly function without the Oedipus complex’ (2016, 1659). He also notes that ‘Lacan himself (1972, 4–7) also struggled with the question of the differences between symbolic universes’, wondering whether the Japanese, for example, were ‘analysable’. Stitou’s concludes (2016, 1673):

‘the language in which the subject is speaking must be understood in its subjective resonances, at the intersection between singularity and collectivity – a clinical approach that is not blind to cultural references, but remains open to the message of the unconscious. The subject receives this message in the language of his symptom, a language in abeyance’.

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If the Oedipus Complex is problematic, other ethnographic accounts reject it entirely and it is to these I now turn.

**The Alternative Unconscious**

Howes (2010), for instance, develops an account which directly subverts the Freud-Malinowski debate around the Trobriand Islanders. As he argues, the repression of sexuality and the primal scene, central to the Oedipal Complex, simply fails to function in Trobrian society; rather, ‘the Trobriand version of the "primal scene" centres around “the image of children excreting instead”’ (Howes 2010, n.p.). By contrast, ‘sexual acts are not shrouded in secrecy or necessarily hidden from young eyes’:

> For the Trobriand child, therefore, the sexual activity of the parents is not a source of conflict-ridden angst, as Freud would have it. Rather, it is a source of amusement, in that children find that they can make people laugh by imitating the sexual behavior of their elders. (Howes 2010, n.p.)

Consequently, Howes argues, there is a reorganisation of the erotogenic zones, with the nose (‘Freud’s nose’) replacing the genitals so that ‘the nose, and not the oral cavity or mouth, is the primary “erotogenic zone” of the Trobriand body’ (Howes 2010, n.p.). Instead, Trobrianders, ‘like numerous other Melanesian peoples... find the idea of kissing rather silly and insipid’. Likewise, anality and excretion are not experiences of disgust and containment as in Western cultures, prompting Freud to exclaim “’Was, haben denn die Leute keinen Anus?’ (What, have the people no anus then?)’ (quoted in Roheim 1950, 159).

The implications, pursued by Roheim (1950) and others (Merkur 2005), are that the assumed psychosexual stages of development are disrupted, so that the whole order of psychological growth is then put in question.

The nose is one sensory register. Laplantine (2015) explores others. He begins with the kinetic register, instanced in the swaying Brazilian ginga walk. From here he develops a detailed account of the body’s sensorium, an anthropology of the embodied sensible attuned beyond language through ‘the multiplicity of the body’s modalities of perception—the senses’ (Howes 2015, xii). As Laplantine (2015, 116) argues:

> Sensible experience, which is tactile, gustatory, olfactory, perceptive (images), and auditory (the three families of sounds: voices, noises, and music), cannot be reduced to formal linguistics, nor even to language [le langagier]. What we might call the linguistic paradigm gives an account of only a minute part of the sensible. It does not manage even to approach that which is non-propositional, non-predicative, non-categorical in experiences
such as the rhythms of dance, acts of love, modulations of voice, astonishment, surprise, enthusiasm, love at first sight. These are behaviors that are most often unconscious and involuntary, that psychoanalysis has studied through processes of transfer and counter-transfer, and which maintain great closeness to the animality within us.

The implications are considerable; as Howes (2015, viii) comments, ‘For him, “modes of living in society cannot be reduced to systems of signs” (contrary to Lévi-Strauss)’. Instead, Laplantine’s proposition of a choreographic model of the sensuous body mounts a formidable challenge to ‘the rules of method (Cartesian, Baconian, Durkheimian) clearly founded on the elimination of subjectivity’ (Laplantine 2015, 18). Cartesian dualism is ‘the order of logos (be it Platonic, Christian, Cartesian), which culminates in denotative logic, a univocal, uniform, unilateral, monological, monocultural, monolingual logic’ (Laplantine 2015 106). Such a critique of classification and the limits of ordering has an extensive history via Foucault and Canguilhem in critical theory, anthropology and psychoanalysis (Sarti 2010).

Laplantine’s (2015, 24) description of ‘schizophrenogenic dualism’ is echoed by other anthropologists. For example, Kohn (2015), in How Forests Think, goes further, expanding non-dualism to the entire anthropocene. Exploiting Peircian semiotics, he reworks the human/non-human divide, foregrounding ‘the interactions of humans with (and between) animals, plants, physical processes, artifacts, images, and other forms of beings’ (Descola 2014, 268). Kohn’s approach attempts to recast the whole process of symbolisation and representation, reconfiguring it as Latour (2014, 262) notes, as a ‘shift “beyond human” and “beyond language” but not—that’s the key point—beyond meaning. Vibrations include river catchments, forests, the dead, dogs, colonial history, biological lineages, and of course pumas, and dreams’.4

This ‘potential richness of non-symbolic forms of representation’ (Herrera and Palsson 2014, 238) has attracted intensive commentary, for instance a book symposium in Hau (2014). For our purposes, it raises two points that relate back to Children of the Rain. First, it re-articulates a Māori perspective of illness. As the Tūhoe commentator quoted earlier remarked of Niki and his spirit worlds, ‘he would actually see those things as being real, and so it would be cross-spoken with the elders who would understand that patupaiarehe, or fairies as such, were real things’. So, too, with Kohn (2013); but the idioms, relations, vibrations of communication are woven together in ways that defy Western classifications of schizophrenia. This, in turn, raises the issue of the ontological turn discussed in recent ethnographic theory. As Salmond (2014, 157) observes of Te Aitanga a Hauiti whakapapa:

In the Hauiti case, whakapapa’s strategic encompassment of the ethnographic process within its own relational matrices often made it impossible to determine who was the “subject” and what was the “object” of
investigation at a given moment—who or what was being compared, and on which terms.

‘How’, she continues (2014, 159), ‘are we to take a discussion that claims to champion native thinking while apparently declining, at a certain point, to engage native thinkers on their terms, whatever that might mean?’ As my next section discusses, what also happens if we are to give such ‘native thinking’ equality or predominance? What, in Kohn’s terms (2013, 2), if the jaguar looks back at you?

But this issue is entangled with a second one. If such relations can be so reconfigured, how are we to understand the unconscious? Is there either a universal unconscious, an ‘ethnographic’ unconscious or, following Laplantine, an unconscious fluidly distributed as a sensorial, interlaced array?  

Barua and Das (2014) and Willford (2016) chart some recent attempts to resolve this problem. Barua and Das (2014, 8) argue that a concept of intersubjectivity founded on the unconscious as a common site of intentionality, interweaving Heideggerian and Husserlian phenomenology with psychoanalysis, struggles nonetheless to reconcile their differing epistemologies. Willford (2016, 754) comments that, given the contexts of ethnographic study, the unconscious is produced under ‘conditions of untenable social hierarchy, violence, and a perceived excess of power’. Such a comment speaks directly to the postcolonial, collective and personal trauma observed throughout Ward’s film. Such experience is exacerbated, Willford notes, not only because analysis works often with a transhistorical notion of the subject but also because differences in method frequently privilege top-down ‘high theory’ approaches over inductive ethnographic enquiry (2016, 754).

French Ethnopsychoanalysis
Sturm et al. (2010, 29) take a different route, mobilising French ethnopsychoanalysis (see Freeman 2010, Moro 2007). Drawing on Devereux’s foundational work (1972) and the practice of ‘complementarism’ they investigate trauma as ‘an overwhelming experience that cannot be represented and integrated into the network of psychic representations’ (2010, 29). Such pre-symbolic experience can then be understood in a collective and cultural frame, for instance where there are ‘nonconcluded transformations’: these transformations (van Gennep, 1909) illuminate moments where, in the liminal phase between old and new social identities, ‘common social rules are inverted, disgusting or forbidden experiences may be provoked, and all aspects of the old identity will be denied or turned to their opposites’ (Sturm et al. 2010, 28). This unsymbolised experience, born of personal and collective components, is the trauma – the non-concluded transformation. Differently articulated to Lacan’s Real, through the practice of direct fieldwork, the value of this perspective is to situate individual experience with cultural practice, and to do so
through a clinical lens of ‘complementarism’. Using this model, for instance, a case could be made that both Niki’s and Puhi’s traumatising experiences in *Rain of the Children* involve overlapping layers of non-concluded transformations. Ethnopsychoanalysis trauma work is both relational and symbolic, but within the sociocultural meaning systems of its sufferers. Yet it still adopts an inherently Western perspective where two or more sociocultural systems confront each other through the dominating lens of one.

Stitou (2016, 1657) observes of French ethnopsychiatry, ‘The unconscious often appears... as an answer to the uneasy relationship between culture and psyche, a relationship that becomes even more complicated when we are dealing with cultural difference’. Bidima (2000, 77) articulates the fragility of this perspective, enumerating tensions around power, the use of theory and the construction of meaning. He also highlights problems of translation, such as ‘the status of the untranslatable’ where ‘some African languages do not have the word “calendar”, how therefore should this notion be inserted in the translation of the perception of temporality by the patient?’

**STS and Symmetry**

Translation becomes the key issue in recent attempts to reverse fields and privilege the non-Western Other. Law and Lin in a number of papers (e.g. 2010, 2016, 2017a-c) have recently undertaken an intriguing experiment, through a dialogue with the ‘East’, interrogating those disciplines that have ‘usually made use of Euro-American analytical terms’ (Law and Lin 2015, n.p.) in order to rethink postcoloniality, symmetry, science and technology, and translation. Employing Science and Technologies Studies (STS), they comment (2017a, n.p.) on the relationship between Euro-American and Taiwanese/Eastern discourses:

institutions and asymmetrical modes of circulation work in ways that tend to lock Taiwanese STS—and those in similar situations—into positions of subordination within Euro-American-ordered disciplinary structures. Indeed, and as a part of this, they also have tended to erode alternative modes of knowing and learning that predated the arrival of the first Euro-American adventurers.

As Zhan (2014, 247) asks:

The question here is thus how to bring STS, medical anthropology, and Traditional Chinese medicine into transdisciplinary engagements without reproducing the division and hierarchy of knowledge, or re-creating the bifurcation of the analytical and the analysed.

STS has a continuing dialogue with anthropology (de la Cadena and Lien 2014), but here, in one experiment, Law and Lin trace the ensemble of practices and meanings around Chinese
terms. They draw on ziran (自然), ‘the Chinese term normally used to (mis)translate the English word “nature”’ into Chinese (Law and Lin 2017b, 3); they also attempt to insert the word shi (勢) – very roughly, ‘propensities’ – into STS (Law and Lin 2016). So far, the experiment has illuminated the immense difficulties of reconstituting one set of sociocultural dispositions, or regimes, in terms of another. For instance, ‘To insert shi (勢) into an STS truth regime is therefore to conceal an important shi (勢)-relevant Chinese reality’ (Law and Lin 2016, n.p.). It has also prompted intense transdisciplinary and cross-cultural debate (Kuo 2017). It has further prompted a recognition by Law and Lin (2016, n.p., 2017) that method is emphatically ‘provincial’ or local, not universal (Law and Lin 2015). Also, that utilising shi (勢), for instance, suggests ‘the idea of ‘truth’ is displaced by something akin to ‘efficacy’ (gōng xiào, 功效)’ with important implications for how academic work is performed (Law and Lin 2016, n.p).

**The Ethnographic Unconscious**

None of these debates include any reference to the unconscious, ethnographic or otherwise. Yet, clear implications follow from the experiments and debates. One is to highlight that if the unconscious is, itself, understood as a shifting ensemble or assemblage then it, too, is inevitably reconstituted according to sociocultural and socio-political context. In short, the notion of a binary: of an ethnographic or Western, universal unconscious is undone and replaced, as in STS, as a symmetrical phenomenon. Being symmetrical, as in the case of Kohn’s (2013) forests, jaguars and vibrations, or Laplantine’s (2014) sinuous, embodied sensibilities, then it is necessarily produced out of these multiple, polymorphous associations. Moreover, it accommodates the rituals and practices of dreaming, shamanic and spirit worlds (e.g. Pedersen 2011, Verran 2004). Such an unconscious may be erotogenic, olfactory (Howes 2010) or otherwise ordered (Asai and Barnlund 1988). Whichever it is, it is continuously sensitised to differentially dispersed arrays of signifiers across any of the five senses. Operating out of awareness it produces different formations of repressed, neural preconscious, co- and collective unconscious which interact dynamically with its complex, co-produced environment.8

As with STS (Law and Lin 2017c, 262), the unconscious is amenable for ‘exploring and characterising the constraints and affordances – institutional, practical, material, conceptual, stylistic, normative, epistemological, and ontological’ embedded in the social spaces within which it arises – and is, inevitably, constituted through them. Crucially, it remains a highly dynamic unconscious, responsive to the ‘provincial’ circumstances in which it is articulated or interrogated. In this perspective, a Western unconscious is as local as a Tūhoe unconscious, but figured entirely differently, in the same way that the terms ziran (自然) and ‘nature’ stand in difficult relation to each other.
Moreover, trauma and the unconscious stand in a similar relation as specific cultural inventions: a point emphasised by Ian Hacking (1986, 1999) on how such Western concepts as PTSD or child abuse were originally constituted. Each of these, he argues, are historical assemblages, emerging in response to specific sociocultural pressures in the same way as hysteria or, more recently, eating disorders have been as particular Western diagnostic and pharmacological practices (Watters 2011).

Where trauma is concerned, suffering always remains suffering regardless of social context (Kleinman et al. 1997) but its construction and experience as trauma arises from particular social histories. Indeed, as Hacking (1999, 123) notes, Western diagnoses produce the very conditions they diagnose through a Cartesian dualism of ‘dynamics working at the level of classification and at the level of biolooping’ that reproduce the subject through classification. It is in these contexts that ethnopsychoanalysis attempts ‘provincial’ solutions by ‘complementarism’: assembling practices, beliefs and relations relevant to the resolution of mental suffering within the disciplinary and institutional constraints in which it is engaged.

All this is pertinent to the experiences portrayed in Rain of the Children, whether it is the depiction of postcolonial, collective or individual suffering, through the portrayal of Niki’s schizophrenic gifts with animals, trees and and spirit worlds, or through the exploration and lament that Ward realises in the dual worlds he inhabits. In a sense, the film itself, witnessed by its audiences, becomes an attempt at a collective visual ethnopsychoanalysis, a commensuralism, attempting to engage with the meaning of Puhí’s mākutu and its unconscious impact on Ward. The film becomes a strenuous effort, within the dynamics of postcolonial power, to symbolise both their, and Ward’s, unarticulated experience across incommensurable cultural registers.

**Conclusion**

In brief, the arc from Freud and the early anthropological disputes to Law and Lin’s (2010) postcolonial symmetry outlines the numerous cross-cultural tensions, including the often inherent experience of suffering, that varying institutional, disciplinary and cultural formations attempt to navigate. These are always within fields of domination and subordination; Rain of the Children resonates with these same force fields. What it illustrates is how the unconscious itself becomes a shifting formation, sensitised and differently articulated according to the social and historical circumstances within which it is emergent.

**Notes**

1. Every term, ‘Western’, ‘indigenous’, Māori, ‘us’ has, as Law and Lin (2017, 58) remark, ‘histories (including academic histories)’; terms such ‘Chinese’ are endlessly ambiguous markers; Chinese
language is heterogeneous; “the West” itself is hardly homogeneous; ‘even within STS, the division between theory and case study is not simply problematic but also has been extensively problematised’.

2. And see Leader 2003 and Lagaay on Lacan and the register of the voice.

3. ‘We understand nothing about Brazilian society without this art of slipping, dribbling, swinging, also of advancing through a conversation oscillating between yes and no. Brazil moves according to the rhythmicity of curvature, which defies the straight line and all that is orthogonal’ (Laplantine 2015, 8).

4. See Salmond (2014, 167) for a more local version: ‘wood carvings that are ancestors; powerful powder; collections that make sense of catastrophes; and so on. An attitude of openness to what might become an ethnographic subject is required by recursive approaches, such that what could initially appear as animals, plants, artifacts, texts, and even landscapes are all potential candidates for relational engagement and elucidation’.

5. Mimica (2006, 11) emphasises the extensive links and overlaps between Husserlian and existential phenomenology and non-Western epistemes, following Shahid Naeem’s view that ‘The world as it-is lives fully within the parameters of psychoanalysis, and psychoanalysis is fully a part of the world-as-it-is’.

6. Ethnopsychoanalysis and ethnopsychiatry is, itself, an unstable field which, as its naming suggests, carries its own unresolved tensions (Bidima 2000).

7. See Law and Lin (2017) for one discussion of confounding terminological difficulties.

8. It is worth noting that psychoanalysis and psychotherapy practice constitute a set of technologies. Unlike Hacking’s (1999) critique of depression, these are intellectual and affective instruments that detect, divine and symbolise through projection, introjection, empathic identification, defence formations, self-states, attunement and enactment. Together, these form part of a panoply of contemporary Western psychosomatic curative technologies.

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